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Institut de hautes études en administration publique (IDHEAP), University of Lausanne, Lausanne,
Switzerland
ABSTRACT Functional advantages and drawbacks are commonly mentioned to ration-
ally justify or condemn municipality amalgamations. However, many consolidation pro-
jects are resisted by local governments or citizens on the grounds that amalgamation
would dampen local identity. A municipality’s name change is probably the most visible
sign of the loss of community bond experienced by citizens at amalgamation time. This
article aims to put a value on this loss by measuring citizen willingness to pay for their
city name. This methodological approach innovates upon the literature on municipal
amalgamation and place branding by exploiting the versatility of the so-called contingent
valuation method (CVM). CVM confronts respondents, in a survey setting, with a
hypothetical market in which a characteristic of interest is exchanged. Here the char-
acteristic is the possibility to retain one’s city name for an amalgamated jurisdiction. The
article presents the estimates provided by a survey conducted in four Swiss cities.
KEY WORDS: Municipal amalgamation, city name, local identity, place branding,
willingness-to-pay, contingent valuation
1. Introduction
Functional advantages and drawbacks are commonly mentioned to rationally
justify or condemn amalgamations – or consolidation or merger – of municipa-
lities. Possible efﬁciency gains, like economies of scale, reduction of geographic
spillovers or increasing coordination, are confronted with efﬁciency losses, like
diseconomies of scale, inadequacy of public services in case of heterogeneous
preferences (e.g. King and Ma 2000). In reality, many amalgamation projects are
resisted by local governments in the case of state-imposed amalgamation (Hanes,
Wikström, and Wångmar 2012) or by the population if a referendum takes place.
This is precisely what has happened on several occasions in Switzerland where
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this kind of project must usually be put to the ballot. One common conjecture for
the rejection of such a proposal has less to do with functional, than with psycho-
sociological, reasons: any merger would dampen citizen identiﬁcation with the
newly amalgamated municipality compared to the pre-existing municipality
(Kushner and Siegel 2005; Jones and Soguel 2010). Indeed, as stated by
Steiner (2003), ‘when a municipal merger occurs, one or more municipalities
cease to exist. The essential trait of a merger is the complete surrendering of
independence by one or several municipalities. All municipal tasks are fulﬁlled
by the new municipality’ (554).
The most visible sign of identiﬁcation loss is the jurisdiction’s post-amalga-
mation name change. Indeed the name is the most visible element – together with
the armorial bearing – that ties residents to and constructs identiﬁcation with
their communities. According to Delattre (2007), the name is ‘the principal
vector of identity’ and ‘represents the organisation as a whole’ (270). A munici-
pality’s name change following an amalgamation severs this bond, generates a
loss of identiﬁcation and eventually of welfare.
This article contributes to the literature on municipal amalgamation and
place branding. It theoretically innovates in the sense that it aims to put a
monetary value on the loss of well-being provoked by the post-merger name
change. From a policy perspective, knowing the importance of the loss
matters. For instance, it should help the higher level of government (for
Switzerland this refers to the canton) to offer an adequate ﬁnancial compen-
sation to the population group whose well-being is affected by the amalgama-
tion. Indeed many Swiss cantons provide ﬁnancial incentives as a reward for
amalgamation in an attempt to reduce the number of municipalities.1 These
incentives help reduce the municipal debt, thus the interest payments and
eventually the local citizens’ tax burden. However, such incentives have not
prevented many consolidation projects from failing when voted upon. An
adequate compensation would increase the chance for an amalgamation pro-
ject to be accepted by voters.
Conceptually, the monetary value of the municipality’s name can be measured
by the citizens’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) to avoid suffering such a loss. Several
techniques exist to value the WTP, the most versatile being the contingent
valuation method (CVM). This kind of versatility is crucial when dealing with
an intangible good like a municipality’s name. CVM consists of surveying
respondents directly about the value they put on the evaluated good, i.e. their
WTP for it. Here the good is the hypothetical (i.e. contingent) possibility of
retaining the municipality’s name for the amalgamated jurisdiction. CVM has
been extensively used in environmental economics and is increasingly applied in
other ﬁelds. However, it has never yet been applied to value a municipality’s
name. In this sense, our research also offers a methodological innovation. Our
case study looks at two amalgamation projects, each between two Swiss cities. A
total of 800 phone interviews were conducted.
Section 2 provides a theoretical background by brieﬂy surveying the literature
regarding local identity, place branding and valuation using CVM. The way we
2 N. Soguel and J. Silberstein
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designed our survey is described in Section 3, including the empirical setting, the
choice of data collection and the contents of the questionnaire.2 Section 4
presents our main results: the stated WTP and the estimated value of the
municipalities’ name. The WTPs are further analysed in Section 5 with statistical
models in order to highlight the inﬂuencing factors. It allows us to assess the
internal validity of the WTP with factors derived from microeconomic theory
and sociological theories. Section 6 concludes the article.
2. Literature and theoretical background
As stated by Bartolini and Fiorillo (2008), functional federalism perspective
does not seem to place sufﬁcient emphasis on ‘local identity’. In some
countries (France, Italy or Spain), ‘local identity is very strong for historical
reasons’ and ‘any form of cooperation imposed by a higher level of govern-
ment is destined to encounter strong resistance’ (53–54). Dollery and Akimov
(2009) observe that losing one’s ‘local identity’ is often a signiﬁcant hurdle to
voluntary alliances in local government. For instance, in Australia, the
National Ofﬁce of Local Government (1998) acknowledges that municipal
amalgamations potentially introduce a ‘dominance of one area over another’
and a ‘loss of identity’ (56).
Human geography and sociology offer positive explanations for understanding
the role played by local identity in the municipal amalgamation or break-up
phenomenon. For Debarbieux (2006), ‘the shared feeling and willingness of
several individuals to belong to the same group’ (342) is the foundation of
collective identity and feeling of belonging. According to Le Bart (1999), the
municipality’s name, history, town hall, logo or crest are all ‘mobilizing myths’
(424), ‘contemporary totems’ (425) that must be recognised in order to establish
territorial borders. As Bourdieu (1980) indicates, the population will integrate the
municipality’s name and oft-repeated slogans and this will contribute to the
creation of its collective history.
Marketing literature has investigated how country names are used as trade-
marks and how they develop as place branding (Kotler and Gertner 2002).
Studies dedicated to a city’s image and management of city-type ‘branding’
are more recent (Kavaratzis and Ashworth 2005; Anholt 2006). There is very
little research that looks speciﬁcally at communal name changes; even if
Lynch (1960) did highlight that naming practices could strengthen the identity
of an urban space. Delattre (2007) offers the ﬁrst attempt to document these
name changes. All of these marketing-centred studies share an analysis of the
way in which the name, the brand, are perceived from outside the municipality
concerned.
To the best of our knowledge, only one study – Adam (2008) – looks at the
importance of a name within the framework of citizen identiﬁcation with their
municipality, and within an amalgamation perspective. The author focuses on
ﬁve amalgamations in Quebec in which the name of the community seems to
have played a decisive role. By analysing regional news coverage of political
Amalgamation and Willingness-To-Pay for Municipal Name 3
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debates, he shows that the names retained by the post-fusion communities most
often make a reference ‘to an entity of the physical surroundings’ (278). From
this she deducts a desire or a tendency to reconcile the individual with a place,
with nature.
Following Stiglitz’s deﬁnition (1983), identiﬁcation with a community
through the municipal name can be seen as a local public good. It is a pure
public good ‘within’ the community with both deﬁning characteristics of
being non-rival and non-exclusive. It is thus subject to a market failure: no
market exists that would directly indicate its price and thus how much the
identiﬁcation through name is worth.
In the ﬁeld of welfare economics, the contingent valuation method, CVM,
was introduced as a technique that should allow individuals to express their
preferences by essentially stating their WTP when no market price is avail-
able. Originally CVM was used to estimate individual attachment to environ-
mental amenities or their preferences to avoid various pollution types. CVM
was then opened to other domains (Carson 2011). Nevertheless, its applica-
tion to local government and urban studies literature is not yet common.
Because it utilises hypothetical scenarios, CVM is a very versatile technique.
But precisely because of that CVM is also prone to a large number of biases,
although this is still an extensively debated issue (Hausman 2012; Carson
2012). These doubts regarding the technique’s ability to provide valid esti-
mates must be kept in mind along with the recommendations made to
improve the technique’s validity (Arrow et al. 1993).
3. Methodology and survey design
CVM allowed us to confront individuals with a hypothetical situation of two
municipalities about to amalgamate, a situation that does not exist yet, and
to state their preference accordingly. Other techniques do exist to measure
an individual’s preference for non-market goods.3 However, many of these
rely on observing how people make their choices in a real-world setting. In
this sense, CVM is far more ﬂexible. The contingent scenario may be
framed in many different ways. Individuals can be asked about their WTP,
either to beneﬁt from a hypothetical improvement or avoid a hypothetical
deterioration of an existing situation. Alternatively, they can be questioned
about their willingness to accept (WTA) a compensation either to forgo a
hypothetical improvement or to suffer a hypothetical deterioration. Various
authors, among whom Arrow et al. (1993), advise against the WTA for-
mulation in order avoid overestimating the value. Since the existing litera-
ture points towards an identiﬁcation loss in case the municipality’s name
changes after an amalgamation, the scenario is based on a hypothetical
deterioration.
Our questionnaire was designed to be administered via phone survey. Various
preliminary versions of the questionnaire were tested, paying special attention to
the design of the contingent scenario and the WTP question.
4 N. Soguel and J. Silberstein
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Our case study looks at amalgamation projects between neighbouring cities,
the ﬁrst between the municipality of Montreux (M) and Vevey (V); the second
between La Chaux-de-Fonds (LCF) and Le Locle (LL). The pairs were chosen
not only because the idea of an amalgamation with the neighbouring munici-
pality has already been discussed, but also because all four Swiss jurisdictions
are urbanised cities of more than 10,000 inhabitants.4
The ﬁrst part of the questionnaire included questions to gently bring the
respondent to the contingent scenario. For example, respondents were asked to
what extent they were attached to the name of the municipality they lived in. The
hypothetical scenario was as follows5:
Imagine for a second that both populations of Montreux and Vevey had
already agreed upon the amalgamation and that, in a second step, the
populations are consulted regarding the name of the novel municipality.
The chosen name can be either Montreux or Vevey. The choice will depend
upon the value that each population puts to the name of its own munici-
pality. Hence, for example, if the population of Vevey puts a higher value
to its own name then the novel municipality will be called Vevey. To set
the value that every inhabitant put to the name of Montreux they will be
asked how much they would be willing to pay through a single payment.
Therefore I am going to suggest you a number of amounts; let me know
the amount that best ﬁts the single payment that you would agree to pay in
order that the name Montreux would be chosen.
A series of increasing bids reﬂecting the existing Swiss coins and banknotes was
proposed: CHF 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500,6 1,000 and more than CHF 1,000.
Respondents were repeatedly asked if they would agree to pay each bid. One
person out of two was presented the bids in a decreasing order of magnitude to
prevent a starting-point bias. The respondents who were willing to pay a con-
tribution were then given the chance to reﬁne their choice with an open question
and to give us a more accurate WTP.7 Respondents who refused to pay anything
were asked debrieﬁng questions to explain their refusal.
The contingent scenario is based on a unique payment by the participant. This
solution was retained because it matches the idea that the payment should occur
simultaneously with the amalgamation and with the municipal name change.
Moreover, in case the canton offers a grant to incentivise the amalgamating
municipalities, the grant is paid in one go. The scenario sticks to the valuation-
relevant elements that we wanted the respondent to consider in stating his WTP
and does not dedicate much attention to payment mechanics to avoid a possible
information overload.8
Of course any municipal amalgamation triggers various effects aside from a
possible change in the jurisdiction name. Signiﬁcant functional consequences,
either positive or negative, are usually expected. These interact with the overall
preferences for the amalgamation compared to the status quo. For that reason,
our scenario explicitly concentrates on the issue of the name. It speciﬁes that the
Amalgamation and Willingness-To-Pay for Municipal Name 5
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decision to merge has already been agreed upon by the population of both cities.
Therefore, the naming issue is all that remains. This empirical strategy stems
from the welfare economics theoretical framework. According to this frame-
work, the individual’s utility is separable, meaning that the state of each
component inﬂuences the individual’s well-being independently from the state
of the other components, including income (Champ, Boyle, and Brown 2003).
To put it differently, the name change has an inﬂuence by itself, just in the same
way that each functional consequence of the amalgamation independently
inﬂuences the respondent’s satisfaction.
The last part of the questionnaire was dedicated to the respondent’s personal
characteristics and opinions. The last question was about the respondent’s house-
hold annual income. If they did not spontaneously answer the question, various
income bands were offered for their selection.
The survey was conducted in the spring of 2012 with 800 citizens (about 200
in each municipality) by six trained interviewers. To lower interviewer bias, all
interviewers surveyed in every municipality. The sample was randomly chosen
from the phone book. It is representative of the repartition between men and
women according to the Pearson χ2 test. However, single and young people
(younger than 40) are under-represented as is often the case in surveys dealing
with sociopolitical issues (Gaxie 1990). The under-representation stems also
from the sampling technique (Link et al. 2007).9
4. Survey results
Table 1 describes the answer rate in each municipality (unit response rate). It also
shows that more than 60% of the 1,318 contacted persons agreed to answer the
survey. It ﬂuctuates within a narrow interval (54–67%) and therefore the number of
persons who agreed to answer the survey (803) is also quite evenly distributed.
However, several respondents (298 = 803 – 505) refused to participate in the
hypothetical market. Thus the response rate to the WTP question (item response
rate) reaches on average 63% of the respondents. This level of (non)response is
common in CVM surveys, compared to other types of surveys that have a lower
level of item nonresponse.
Table 1. Response rate to the survey and WTP question
Municipality
Number of
contacted
persons
Number of
persons who
agreed to answer
Unit
response
rate
Number of
response to the
WTP question
Item response rate
to the WTP
question in %
Montreux (M) 323 187 57.9 119 63.6
Vevey (V) 340 221 65.0 141 63.8
La Chaux-de-
Fonds (LCF)
315 211 67.0 130 61.6
Le Locle (LL) 340 184 54.1 115 62.5
Total 1,318 803 61.0 505 62.9
6 N. Soguel and J. Silberstein
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Ultimately, 505 out of 803 respondents agreed to participate in the market, to
state their preferences and to answer the WTP questions. However, they did not
behave similarly. Following Grosclaude and Soguel’s (1994) classiﬁcation, and
according to the debrieﬁng question answers, a distinction is made between
participants who are indifferent (72) or receptive (433). The indifferents are
precisely indifferent about the name of the new municipality. Therefore, the
value they put on the name is null and their WTP is zero. The receptives, on
the other hand, do care about the name and are willing to pay for this. Among the
receptives subgroup, an additional distinction is made between the non-solvents
(15) and the solvents (418). Indeed non-solvent participants mentioned that they
cannot afford to make a bid higher than zero although they care about the name.
The solvents gave a strictly positive WTP.
Figure 1 shows how respondents divide into these subgroups (participants,
receptives and solvents) in each municipality. Municipalities are quite evenly
represented in every subgroup.
For the rest of the article, we will analyse the behaviour of the participants,
including people who attributed a positive value to the name (solvents) and
others who stated a WTP equal to zero (non-solvents and indifferents). The 298
respondents who did not answer the WTP question are discarded.
Figure 2 displays the WTP distribution according to the highest accepted
suggested bids (CHF 0, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500, 1,000 or more than CHF
1,000). Panel A gives the information for Vevey on the left-hand side and
Montreux on the right; Panel B for Le Locle (left) and La Chaux-de-Fonds
(right). Generally speaking, the WTP is unevenly distributed with an over-
representation of low bids (CHF 0 or CHF 5 bids) as is the case in numerous
CVM studies. Long tails rise with some outlying observation on the top of the
distribution. In general, the values of CHF 500 and more are situated beyond the
9th percentile. These large bids are a possible manifestation of a hypothetical
bias.10 Speciﬁcally, the distribution of the WTP is both skewed (skewness = 3.24)
with most observations situated on the left side of the mean and leptokurtic
(kurtosis = 13.41) with outliers. An overhead resistance at CHF 100 is also
noticeable.
184
115 98 97
211
130
103 99
221
141
125 119
187
119
107 103
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
Respondents
(n = 803)
Participants
(n = 505, WTP ≥ 0)
Receptives
(n = 433, WTP ≥ 0)
Solvents
(n = 418, WTP > 0)
Montreux
Vevey
La Chaux-de-Fonds
Le Locle
Figure 1. Respondents and participant behaviour on the hypothetical market
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Montreux (Panel A) and La Chaux-de-Fonds (Panel B) are signiﬁcantly
different from the rest of the sample.11 The WTP distribution of LCF is strongly
packed downwards while Montreux WTPs are more evenly distributed.12
Compared to Montreux, Vevey WTPs are more centred with only a few observa-
tions beyond CHF 1,000.13
The WTP may depend on the bid order. To alleviate the so-called starting-point
bias, interviewers alternated the bid order one time out of two, beginning once
with ‘more than CHF 1000’ and next with ‘at least CHF 5’. Table 2 reports
arithmetical mean, geometrical mean and median based on whether the bid
process was increasing or decreasing. The ﬁgures are computed from the reﬁned
reported WTPs, and not from the suggested bids.14 Whatever the indicator, this
PANEL A
PANEL B
5152535
5 15 25 35
0 CHF
5 CHF
10 CHF
20 CHF
50 CHF
100 CHF
200 CHF
500 CHF
1'000 CHF
More than 1000
Number of participants from MontreuxNumber of participants from Vevey
5152535
5 15 25 35
0 CHF
5 CHF
10 CHF
20 CHF
50 CHF
100 CHF
200 CHF
500 CHF
1'000 CHF
More than 1000
Number of participants from La Chaux-de-FondsNumber of participants from Le Locle
Figure 2. Frequency distribution of the participants according to the level of WTP in both pairs of
municipalities (N = 505). Panel A: Vevey and Montreux. Panel B: Le Locle and La Chaux-de-Fonds
8 N. Soguel and J. Silberstein
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shows that participants were inﬂuenced by starting point. As expected, the
increasing process produces lower WTPs. Provided that the incentive to over-
estimate the WTP in a decreasing process is of the same magnitude as the
incentive to underestimate the WTP in an increasing process, the effect on the
overall average should level out, provided the numbers of WTPs generated by
both processes are equal.
In Table 3, measures of central tendency are extrapolated to provide rough
estimates of the value of each municipality’s name. Means – both arithmetic and
geometric – and median are multiplied by the number of inhabitants to obtain the
name values. For instance, in Montreux the participants’ arithmetic mean WTP is
290 Swiss francs whereas the median is CHF 50 because of the skewness of the
WTP distribution. At CHF 83 the geometric mean is a better instrument to
estimate the central value because it is less sensitive to large bids as is the case
of the traditional arithmetic mean. The central value in La Chaux-de-Fonds is by
far the lowest with a geometric mean value of CHF 42 followed by Vevey (48),
Le Locle (58) and Montreux (83).
Estimated by the median and the geometric mean, the loss experienced by the
population of Montreux would be CHF 1.3–2.1 millions if the newly amalga-
mated municipality were named Vevey. For their part, Vevey inhabitants would
experience a loss of about CHF 0.9 million, if the municipality would be named
Montreux. From a purely arithmetical perspective the difference stems from the
Table 2. Measures of central tendency of the bids provided by increasing bids process or decreasing
bids process
Arithmetic
mean
Geometric
mean Median
Number of
observations
Increasing bids
(starting from ‘at least CHF 5’)
81 27 20 246
Decreasing bids
(starting from ‘more than CHF 1000’)
354 146 100 195
Table 3. Value of the name of the municipalities according to the stated willingness to pay
Respondents’ WTP, in CHF
Value of the name of the
municipality, in CHF, based on. . .
Municipality
Number of
inhabitants
Arithmetic
mean
Geometric
mean Median
Arithmetic
mean
Geometric
mean Median
Montreux (M) 25,199 290 83 50 7,307,710 2,091,517 1,259,950
Vevey (V) 18,364 152 48 50 2,791,328 881,472 918,200
La Chaux-de-
Fonds
(LCF)
37,843 143 42 10 5,411,549 1,589,406 756,860
Le Locle (LL) 10,077 203 58 50 2,045,631 584,466 503,850
Amalgamation and Willingness-To-Pay for Municipal Name 9
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fact that Vevey has a signiﬁcantly smaller population and that the mean partici-
pant WTP was lower, i.e. they valued their municipality’s name less. For La
Chaux-de-Fonds and Le Locle, the ﬁndings differ more drastically. The mean
participant WTP in La Chaux-de-Fonds is 30% lower than in Le Locle. However,
since the former is more populated, the overall loss in monetary terms is higher.
At this stage, it thus seems that WTP does not depend much upon the
municipality’s size. Other factors must explain this difference. The next section
is dedicated to identifying these factors.
5. Modelling the willingness to pay
Various econometric models are estimated in order to identify what variables
impact WTP. The need to resort to various models stems from the characteristics
of the dependant variable, i.e. the participants’ WTP.
The WTP variable is truncated since it is not possible to express a negative
WTP. Because of this truncation, there is no discrepancy between the WTP of
respondents who stated a zero value (and they are quite numerous).15 The Tobit
model allows for dealing with the censoring issue. It is a common way of
modelling the WTP (Halstead, Lindsay, and Brown 1991).
However, Tobit models do not address the problem of extreme values. The
problem of large bids must be addressed to avoid non-symmetrically distributed
errors in the regression analysis. To normalise the error distribution and lower the
risk of hypothetical bias by reducing the inﬂuence of large bids, we also
estimated the WTP function using a log-linear speciﬁcation, i.e. where the
dependent variable is the natural logarithmic of the reported WTP.16 This
speciﬁcation allows us to comment more intuitively on the coefﬁcients estimated:
the estimated coefﬁcients express the relative change in WTP when the value of
the considered independent variable varies by one unit.
Table 4 lists the explanatory variables that were constructed using respondent
answers. Variables are grouped into four categories. The category including the
variables reﬂecting the ATTACHMENT is here of special interest. The general
hypothesis is that the stronger the bond (in particular to the municipality or the
name), the higher the value of the municipality’s name and thus the higher the
WTP. Another group brings together variables dedicated to POLITICAL ASPECTS.
An individual’s behaviour on the contingent market and the reported WTP may
be inﬂuenced by political considerations and the participant’s ability to deal or
feel concerned with political issues, one of these issues being amalgamation. The
third group of variables is dedicated to SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS,
including income.
Finally, dummy variables allow us to distinguish between participants accord-
ing to the MUNICIPALITY. These dichotomous variables make it possible to
estimate models that explain the general WTP trend using the ﬁrst three groups
of variables and still reﬂect some local differences using the last group of
variables. Appendix provides the usual summary statistics regarding the inde-
pendent variables.
10 N. Soguel and J. Silberstein
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Table 5 shows the main results of the analysis. Since many respondents
refused to state their income, this variable is excluded from the ﬁrst two
estimated models in order to increase the number of observations. These two
models are therefore based on 488 observations (Model 1 and 2). The last two
models (3 and 4) are estimated including the income and are thus based on a
restricted number of observations. The issue of a possible multi-collinearity
between explanatory variables was investigated by computing the variance
inﬂation factors (VIF) and no sign of such problem appeared.17 The hetero-
scedasticity issue was also controlled using computing models with robust
standard errors.
Although the ﬁrst two models use different estimators, results are close to each
other, either in terms of sign, degree of signiﬁcance or magnitude of the
Table 4. Explanatory variables of the WTP
Variable Description
ATTACHMENT
Attach._municipality Attachment to the municipality. Ordinal variable: 1 = not attached at all;
4 = very attached
Attach._name Attachment to the municipality name. Ordinal variable: 1–4
Attach._canton Attachment to the canton. Ordinal variable: 1–4
Contact_people Contact with people in the municipality. Ordinal variable: 1 = no contact;
4 = very frequent contacts
School_attendance Place of school attendance. Ordinal variable: 1 = in the municipality; 4 = in
another county
Perceived_image Perceived image of the municipality. Ordinal variable: 1 = poor image of
municipality; 4 = very good image
POLITICAL ASPECTS
Regular_voters Respondents that vote regularly. Binary variable: 1 = yes, 0 = no
Political_activities Number of political activities in which respondent participates. Ordinal
variable: 0 = no political activities; 5 = ﬁve activities mentioned
Info._municipal_life Degree of information about the municipal life. Ordinal variable: 1 = never
informed; 4 = very regularly informed
Political_tendency:
left, centre, right
Categorical variable with 3 dummies: left, centre, right. No political
tendency is the baseline when left = 0, centre = 0 and right = 0
Vote_no_if_name_
change
Respondents that would vote against an amalgamation proposal if the name
had to be changed. Binary variable: 1 = vote against the proposal if the
name change; 0 = otherwise
Name_interest Willingness to be integrated in the name change process. Ordinal variable:
1 = do not want to be involved in the process; 4 = deﬁnitely want to be
involved.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
Gender Men or women. Binary variable: woman = 1; man = 0
Age Age of the respondents. Discrete variable
Education Highest educational level reached. Ordinal variable: 1 = basic scholarship;
4 = university diploma
Income Annual individual income. Discrete variable from 0 to ∞ (interval width of
CHF 20ʹ000)
MUNICIPALITY:
Montreux, Vevey, La
Chaux-de-Fonds
Categorical variable with 3 dummies: Montreux, Vevey, La Chaux-de-
Fonds. Le Locle is the baseline when M = 0, V = 0 and LCF = 0)
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Table 5. Models explaining the WTP for one’s municipality name
Tobit model
(Model 1)
Log-linear
model
(Model 2)
Log-linear model
including income
(Model 3)
Restricted Log-linear
model including
income1 (Model 4)
Tobit Linear regressions
Variables Coefﬁcients and standard errors (in brackets)
ATTACHMENT
Attach._municipality 0.489*** 0.356** 0.382** 0.336**
(0.149) (0.118) (0.145) (0.136)
Attach._name 0.588*** 0.487*** 0.415*** 0.406**
(0.144) (0.104) (0.122) (0.135)
Attach._canton 0.253* 0.221* 0.311* 0.331
(0.124) (0.108) (0.129) (0.123)**
Contact_people 0.216 0.164 0.082 –
(0.145) (0.115) (0.138)
School_attendance 0.135 0.111 0.094 –
(0.089) (0.076) (0.093)
Perceived_image 0.049 0.081 0.239 –
(0.158) (0.132) (0.161)
POLITICAL ASPECTS
Regular_voters 0.265 0.168 0.313 –
(0.288) (0.243) (0.302)
Political_activities 0.011 0.037 0.006 –
(0.138) (0.122) (0.157)
Info._municipal_life 0.189 0.148 0.219 –
(0.156) (0.126) (0.156)
Political_tendency: left 0.109 0.131 0.125 –
(0.305) (0.248) (0.305)
Political_tendency: centre 0.189 0.218 0.100 –
(0.374) (0.308) (0.372)
Political_tendency: right 0.201 0.260 0.349 –
(0.346) (0.281) (0.354)
Vote_no_if_name_change 0.752*** 0.580*** 0.584** 0.545***
(0.221) (0.181) (0.218) (0.219)
Name_interest 0.491*** 0.363*** 0.363*** 0.367***
(0.099) (0.072) (0.087) (0.097)
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
Gender −0.172 −0.160 −0.475* −0.543*
(0.209) (0.186) (0.220) (0.204)
Age −0.002 −0.001 −0.000 –
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
Education 0.476** 0.405** – –
(0.156) (0.130)
Income – – 0.053 0.076*
(0.046) (0.036)
MUNICIPALITY (Le Locle as based line)
La Chaux-de-Fonds −0.409 −0.353 −0.141 –
(0.287) (0.253) (0.312)
Vevey −0.623** −0.510* −0.351 −0.419*
(0.284) (0.258) (0.302) (0.218)
Montreux 0.091 0.134 0.215 –
(0.334) (0.274) (0.333)
(continued )
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coefﬁcient. This demonstrates that the ﬁndings do not depend upon a particular
methodological choice and are quite robust. Hereafter we focus on the results of
the log-linear speciﬁcation to present the results.
The ATTACHMENT to the municipality and its name or to the canton are all
positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with the WTP. If the attachment to the
municipality increases by one degree (e.g. from 1 to 2), the WTP increases by
43% (all other things being equal). Attachment to the municipality’s name
inﬂuences it more strongly (63%), whereas attachment to the canton impacts
the WTP to a lesser extent (25%). This agrees with theories in human geography,
which consider attachment to places as non-exclusive (Duchesne 2008).
Other variables in the ATTACHMENT category do not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
WTP (contact with people in the municipality, place of scholarship, perceived
image of the municipality). This ﬁnding somehow contradicts authors who
consider that closeness (Di Méo 2007) and shared experience (Pérés 2001) create
a sense of belonging to a group.
Most of the variables reﬂecting the POLITICAL ASPECTS turn out to be insig-
niﬁcant. This conﬁrms previous ﬁndings according to which neither the political
leaning nor the traditional political divide is relevant for amalgamation issues
(Silberstein and Soguel 2012). People that are actively participating in municipal
life do not report a signiﬁcantly different WTP compared to those who are not. In
contrast, participants who would vote against a municipal amalgamation if the
name of the municipality were changed reported a 58% higher WTP. And
participants who are keen to be involved in the naming decision report a WTP
that is 36% higher than others.
When it comes to the participant’s SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, edu-
cation level is the only variable that signiﬁcantly inﬂuences the WTP. People
with a higher education reported a higher WTP.
Generally, place of residence did not signiﬁcantly affect WTP. All other
things equal, the WTP is the same in Montreux and La Chaux-de-Fonds
Table 5. (Continued).
Tobit model
(Model 1)
Log-linear
model
(Model 2)
Log-linear model
including income
(Model 3)
Restricted Log-linear
model including
income1 (Model 4)
Tobit Linear regressions
Variables Coefﬁcients and standard errors (in brackets)
Constant 5.227*** 4.822*** 5.166*** 6.483***
(0.940) (0.777) (0.943) (0.525)
N 488 488 366 368
F-test 11.42 9.68 6.58 23.17
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo-R2 0.0859 0.2931 0.2762 0.2596
Notes: *signiﬁcant at 0.05; **signiﬁcant at 0.01; ***signiﬁcant at 0.001.
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compared to that in Le Locle. The only noticeable exception appears in Vevey
where the reported WTP was half that reported in Le Locle (and thus in La
Chaux-de-Fonds and Montreux since coefﬁcients are not signiﬁcant in both
cases). Neotoponymy theory provides us with some clues about possible
reasons for this difference. A population identiﬁes itself more easily with
territorial names when the name provides a positive comparison with regard
to others, when the name testiﬁes to empirical facts, when it testiﬁes to place
history (Adam 2008).
Including the income variable in Model 2 forces a drop of the ‘education’
variable in Model 3 for collinearity reasons and a sacriﬁce of some observa-
tions due to missing data. Income positively inﬂuences the reported WTP;
although the inﬂuence is statistically not signiﬁcant at the 95% threshold. The
gender variable becomes signiﬁcant with women reporting a WTP half the
size of men’s. This is consistent with previous ﬁndings in Switzerland
(Grosclaude and Soguel 1994).
Model 4 focuses on the income variable and retains only the variables that
exert a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on Model 1 to Model 3. As expected, the sign of the
relationship to WTP remains unchanged together with the magnitude of the
inﬂuence. By so doing the inﬂuence of the income becomes signiﬁcant. A one-
step increase in the income scale, i.e. a CHF 20,000 increase in annual income,
raises the WTP by 8%. Therefore, the impact is quantitatively low compared to
that of other independent variables. The fact that the quantitative impact is low
saves us the trouble of weighting the WTP according to the income to get a
consistent central value, like the ones reported in Table 3 (Bateman et al. 2002).
Most of the other variables in Model 4 somehow reﬂect the utility of the
municipality name–or the preferences for it. The fact that WTP is inﬂuenced
both by individual preferences and income is supported by standard microeco-
nomic theory. This provides us with some conﬁdence that the preferences stated
through the WTP by survey participants are internally valid.
6. Conclusion
As an innovative contribution to the literature on place branding and local
identity, the present study measures the value of municipal names in monetary
terms. The contingent valuation method was used to survey the population on its
willingness to pay (WTP) to prevent the loss of a municipality’s name after an
amalgamation, and thus to avoid a loss of identiﬁcation and eventually a
subsequent and related loss of welfare. Respondents were placed in a hypothe-
tical situation to elicit their WTP. The phone interviews were carried out in four
Swiss cities: Montreux, Vevey, La Chaux-de-Fonds and Le Locle. A total of 505
persons agreed to participate in the bidding process. Depending on the munici-
pality, the average geometric WTP varies between CHF 42 in La Chaux-de-
Fonds and CHF 83 in Montreux per resident for retaining the municipal name.
From a research perspective, our regression analysis statistically demonstrates
that the value of a municipality’s name depends upon a range of variables largely
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in accordance with those suggested by theory or the existing literature. The stated
WTP to keep the name of the municipality is higher when the respondent
acknowledges a strong attachment to the municipality. The WTP is also higher
when the respondent says he would vote against a municipal amalgamation
should a referendum on this issue be organised or when the respondent wants
to be involved in decisions about the name of the amalgamated municipality.
Finally, it increases with the respondent’s education level and income.
Controlling for these various characteristics explains most of the difference in
WTP. These results provide us with some conﬁdence that the stated WTP is
internally valid. From this perspective, it would be worth reproducing the
analysis in other countries to check to what extent the WTP is sensitive to the
historic or political context.
The results are also interesting in showing that many aspects do not inﬂuence
the value and thus the WTP, among which the individual’s political tendency and
the political activities as well as where – in which municipality – the respondent
lives or his age. If the WTP is to be considered as a proxy for the identiﬁcation to
the municipality, these ﬁnding are noteworthy.
Extrapolated on the basis of the geometric mean and the population size, the
value of the name of La Chaux-de-Fonds can be estimated to be CHF 1.6 million
in case of a possible amalgamation with Le Locle, which is the neighbouring
municipality. Oppositely, the name of Le Locle is CHF 0.6 million. The value of
the name of Montreux would be CHF 2.1 million in case of amalgamation with
the neighbour Vevey. In contrast, the name of Vevey is CHF 0.9 million.
In terms of policy-making, these estimates are useful. They are an indicator of
the loss of well-being triggered by the possible name change of a given
municipality, even beyond the functional consequences that may also positively
or negatively affect resident well-being. In an institutional setting where jur-
isdictions can freely decide whether or not to merge, the higher level of
government can do nothing but incentivise municipalities if it wants them to
amalgamate. This is especially true when the decision should be put forward in a
referendum. This institutional setting prevails in about half of the Swiss cantons
where approval by the affected municipalities is required and where amalgamat-
ing municipalities are ﬁnancially rewarded. To impact the decision, the appro-
priate ﬁnancial incentive should be large enough to compensate the
amalgamating municipalities and their population for the name loss. To give a
concrete example, let us consider the case of Vevey and Montreux. The legisla-
tion rules that if these two municipalities would merge then the higher level of
government – in this case the canton of Vaud – should offer the new city a
reward of around CHF 1.1 million.18 Compared to our estimates, this amount is
signiﬁcantly insufﬁcient to compensate for the loss of the name in case the new
jurisdiction would be named Vevey, since the estimated lost well-being for the
inhabitants of Montreux is CHF 1.6 million. In comparison, if the new jurisdic-
tion would to be named Montreux, the amount would sufﬁce since the estimated
well-being loss for the inhabitants of Vevey is CHF 0.9 million. All other things
being equal and especially the functional consequences of the amalgamation,
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this demonstrates the importance of both an adequate compensation by the
higher level of government and the choice of the new jurisdiction’s name.
These two aspects increase the chance for amalgamation projects to be accepted,
when forced amalgamations are not an option.
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Notes
1. In 2013, the Swiss Federal Statistical Ofﬁce reported 2,396 municipalities with an
average population of 3,397 inhabitants. The median size was 1,312 inhabitants. The
gap between the average and the median shows that many Swiss municipalities are
tiny. Only 147 municipalities are statistically considered cities (by having a popula-
tion greater than 10,000).
2. The full questionnaire and the database can be obtained by contacting the authors.
3. See Champ, Boyle, and Brown (2003) for a description of the most commonly used
nonmarket valuation techniques.
4. In the ﬁrst pair, Montreux (25,199 inhabitants in 2012) is, however, bigger than
Vevey (18,364) and, in the second pair, La Chaux-de-Fonds (37,843) is bigger than
Le Locle (10,077). Each pair is located within a single agglomeration area. The
respective ﬁnancial positions are somehow diverse. In 2012, at the time of the survey,
Montreux was the least indebted municipality with a 10% ratio of its gross debt to its
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operating revenue, compared to 144% for Vevey, 173% for La Chaux-de-Fonds and
108% for Le Locle. An amalgamation project has been under discussion between
Montreux and Vevey, together with eight other municipalities, since 2011. At the time
of writing, the project is in a technical phase with experts looking for answers to the
various issues to be addressed (land-use planning, economic development, taxation
and ﬁnance, etc.). Between 2003 and 2007, a possible merger between La Chaux-de-
Fonds and Le Locle was designed by the executive branch of the two municipalities.
An information campaign was launched together with an opinion poll. Eventually the
executive branch of Le Locle decided to pull back. Both projects have beneﬁted from
a pretty extensive coverage by the local press. Newspapers still conjecture on future
amalgamation from time to time.
5. The wording of the scenario is given as if the respondent was a resident of Montreux.
In case the respondent was a resident of Vevey, the wording was adapted accordingly
by swapping the name Montreux with Vevey. As for the amalgamation project
between LL and LCH, the wording was adapted accordingly to reﬂect the respon-
dent’s residency. The scenario is of course hypothetical. In reality, after an amalga-
mation takes place the new municipality can be named after either of the pre-existing
jurisdictions or with a totally different name. Anyway it is not possible to speculate
over the name that would be chosen in case the merger ever happens. Some would
argue that the name ‘Montreux’ is more well-known than ‘Vevey’ and that the name
‘La Chaux-de-Fonds’ than ‘Le Locle’. But it does not mean that the most famous
name would be retained. Indeed, as will become clear in next sections, the elicited
WTP is not necessarily higher for the name of Montreux or La Chaux-de-Fonds,
compared to the one for Vevey or Le Locle.
6. Admittedly, there is no CHF 500 banknote. However, the gap between CHF 200 and
CHF 1,000 was too large and needed to be bridged. CHF stands for Swiss francs. At
the time of writing, € and CHF were almost at parity. However, when the survey was
carried out, 1 € was worth 1.2 CHF.
7. 58 respondents actually chose to reﬁne their choice.
8. The various tests we conducted on preliminary versions of the questionnaire dissuaded us
from providing the respondent with additional details via the scenario, especially to take
into account respondent cognitive capacities. For instance, no additional information was
provided regarding the payment vehicle (tax, fee, bill, etc.) or the way the paid amounts
would be redistributed. This has the notable advantage that the scenario remains neutral
with respect to the good to be valued, i.e. the municipality name. Indeed we are most
interested in the unbiased value of the name. Information about how payment collection,
to whom it goes and so on may have inﬂuenced the respondent and thus biased the stated
WTP. See Mitchell and Carson (1989, 2016–2017).
9. Young people often only possess a mobile phone and are rarely registered in the
phonebook.
10. This kind of bias arises because of the hypothetical situation respondents are facing in
a CV survey, when respondents report a WTP that exceeds the amount they would
actually pay if the market really existed.
11. The distribution is signiﬁcantly different according to the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test.
12. There is a signiﬁcant difference at the 0.05 signiﬁcance level between M
and LCF according to Bonferroni (0.035), Scheffe (0.054) and Sidak (0.034)
test.
13. There is a signiﬁcant difference at the 0.05 level between M and V according to
Bonferroni (0.049) and Sidak (0.034) tests (note that here Scheffe test is not sig-
niﬁcant at the 0.05 level).
14. For example, when the last suggested bid, say CHF 10, was accepted and
when the participants reﬁned the value to CHF 12, then the reported WTP is
CHF 12.
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15. Some indifferent respondents might prefer the name of the other municipality. Thus
they may have an even smaller interest in the name of their municipality than those
who simply do not care.
16. The relevance of the choice of a log-linear speciﬁcation was checked by running a
Box–Cox transformation. The log-linear speciﬁcation is situated with a 95% prob-
ability in the interval provided by the computed Box–Cox model. A value of CHF 1
is added to all reported WTPs to avoid zeros (Mitchell and Carson 1989, 372).
17. All Variance Inﬂation Factors (VIF) are by far smaller than 10.
18. The formula provided by the legislation foresees a transfer of CHF 250 per person. This
amount is then multiplied by the size of the population and then capped at a maximum of
3,000 inhabitants whatever the actual number of inhabitants. It is also multiplied by an
incentive factor that increases with the number of amalgamating municipalities. In case
of two jurisdictions, the factor is 1.5. Therefore, shouldM andVamalgamate, they would
receive a transfer of CHF 1.125 million (= 250 × 3000 × 1.5).
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Appendix: Variables summary
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ATTACHMENT TO THE COMMUNITY
Attach._municipality 793 1.825 0.955 1 4
Attach._name 786 2.155 0.976 1 4
Attach._canton 795 2.069 0.978 1 4
Contact_people 795 1.987 0.849 1 4
School_attendance 773 2.379 1.155 1 4
Perceived_image 784 2.041 0.782 1 4
POLITICAL ASPECTS
Regular_voters 803 0.706 0.456 0 1
Political_participation 803 1.029 0.979 0 5
Info._municipality 794 1.936 0.819 1 4
Left_tendency 803 0.430 0.495 0 1
Centre_tendency 803 0.128 0.335 0 1
Right_tendency 803 0.188 0.391 0 1
No_tendency* 803 0.254 0.436 0 1
Vote_no_if_name_change 803 0.484 0.500 0 1
Name_interest 779 1.870 1.253 1 4
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
Gender 803 1.529 0.499 1 2
Age 775 56.819 17.280 18 100
Education 771 2.166 0.707 1 3
Income 559 5.544 2.645 1 26
MUNICIPALITY
Montreux 803 0.233 0.423 0 1
Vevey 803 0.275 0.447 0 1
La Chaux-de-Fonds 803 0.263 0.440 0 1
Le Locle 803 0.229 0.421 0 1
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